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Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
The 49th Street Galleria seeks our review of a decision by
the Utah State Tax Commission requiring the collection of a sales
tax by the Galleria on fees collected for "admission" to its
batting cages, laser tag game, and roller skating rink under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992).! We reverse on the.basis that no

1. The applicable statute provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
(1) There is levied a tax on the
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for
the following:
(continued...)

admission fee, of the sort contemplated in the statute, is
charged by the Galleria.
FACTS
In 1984, the Galleria opened for business as an indoor
entertainment mall in Murray, Utah. The mall houses arcade
games, video machines, a bowling alley, a miniature golf course,
amusement rides, roller skating, batting and pitching cages, food
concessions, and laser tag.2 The public may enter the Galleria
without charge, and tables and seats are placed throughout the
mall for the public to use free of charge. Fees are assessed
only when an individual decides to participate in one of the many
available activities.
Turning to the activities at issue in this case, a batting
cage consists of a fenced area containing a machine that pitches
baseballs or softballs to customers standing within the cage.
The machine is operated either by tokens or by cash payment to an
attendant. An individual pays to have the ball delivered by the
machine. A fee is not charged for simply entering the batting
cage and, indeed, coaches are allowed to stand in the cage and
advise the batter without paying an admission charge.

1.

(...continued)
(f) admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation, including
seats and tables reserved or otherwise,
and other similar accommodations[.]
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992).
The audit that resulted in the imposition of tax liability
was for the period of July 1, 1986, through June 30, 1989. The
substantive law then in effect governs this dispute. Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah
1992). Nonetheless, both parties cite to the 1992 version of the
Utah Code Annotated. That version is identical to the law in
effect for the period from January 1, 1987, to the present.
However, between July 1, 1986, and January 1, 1987, the statutory
language was more succinct and simply stated that the tax was due
on any "amount paid for admission to any place of" amusement,
entertainment, or recreation.11 Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(1) (d)
(Supp. 1986). Since the instant case does not involve facts
contemplated by the statutory language added as of January 1,
1987, we follow the parties' lead in citing the current version
of the code.
2. Laser tag was not offered when the Galleria first opened and
has since been discontinued, but it was offered during the period
of the audit.
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The record contains a less detailed description of laser
tag, but indicates it is operated in a manner similar to the
batting cages. The Tax Commission's findings state that "[u]pon
payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area."
In the roller skating operation, an individual is allowed to
"skate for a period of time upon payment of cash," while parents
and other onlookers may enter the skating facility and observe
without charge*
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Auditing
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission to determine whether
the Galleria's activities would be subject to Utah sales tax.
Kenneth Cook of the Auditing Division informed the Galleria that
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating rink would be
subject to tax, while, apparently, fees for bowling and miniature
golf would not be. The Galleria then sought additional review.
In August of 1984, George M. Loertscher of the Auditing Division
informed the Galleria that roller skating, batting cages,
miniature golf, and bowling were not subject to sales tax.
Relying on Loertscher's letter, the Galleria did not collect
sales tax on the activities identified.3 When the Galleria
subsequently added laser tag to its repertoire of amusements, it
continued its consistent practice of not collecting sales tax on
these activities.
Some years later, the Auditing Division undertook a routine
compliance audit. This time it was determined that the Galleria
was required to collect an admission tax on fees collected for
use of its batting cages, roller skating rink, and laser tag
amusement, but not on the corresponding fees for bowling and
miniature golf. The Galleria sought agency review of the
assessment and the Tax Commission, in a decision dated November
20, 1991, held that fees for use of the batting cages, roller
skating, and laser game were payments for "admission" subject to
sales tax.4 The Galleria then sought reconsideration, and the

3. Equipment rental is a separate matter. The Galleria has
routinely collected sales tax on the rental of bowling shoes and
roller skates by those patrons who do not provide their own
equipment. The taxability of such transactions is not in issue.
4. Because of the conflicting advice provided by the Auditing
Division, the Tax Commission held that the Galleria would not be
liable for the tax due on the roller skating and batting cage
receipts during the period of the audit, but only prospectively.
The Tax Commission now argues that because the tax is not
being assessed against roller skating and batting cage receipts
for the audit period, the issue is moot and any decision on the
(continued.••)

omn(;*5-p»

*

Tax Commission denied that request by decision dated March 10,
1992.5 The Galleria now seeks judicial review of the Tax
Commission's determination that fees for the use of the batting
cages, roller skating rink, and laser tag game are subject to
Utah sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992).
JURISDICTION
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must first
determine whether the petition for judicial review was timely
filed. The Tax Commission issued its final decision on November
20, 1991, and the Galleria petitioned the Commission for
reconsideration on December 10. The Auditing Division filed its
brief in opposition to reconsideration on January 3, 1992, and
the Galleria replied on January 21. The Tax Commission issued
its order denying the petition for reconsideration on March 10,
1992, and the Galleria filed its petition for judicial review
within thirty days of that disposition.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989), a
request for administrative reconsideration is "deemed denied" if
an order is not issued by the agency within twenty days after the
filing of the request.6 The Tax Commission did not issue its

4. (...continued)
future taxability of those receipts is simply an advisory
opinion. We disagree. "A case is deemed moot when the requested
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants."
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). A
determination by this court will affect the rights of the
litigants. Furthermore, the issue has been fully briefed and is
squarely before us. It is clear the real dispute has always been
whether the tax is applicable to these activities, not simply
whether the tax is due for any particular period.
5. In its order denying reconsideration, the Commission
explicitly recognized that the distinction between taxing batting
cages and bowling was difficult to draw and that the disparate
treatment might not exist if a new look at the bowling issue were
undertaken. In a letter dated August 7, 1986, Jim Roger, then
Director of the Auditing Division, recognized that ,f[t]he
Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions
about which activities come under the definition of an
admission."
6.

The "deemed denied" provision states in its entirety:
If the agency head or the person designated
for that purpose does not issue an order
(continued...)
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order denying reconsideration within twenty days of December 10,
1991, but rather some three months later, on March 10, 1992.
Despite its own delay in disposing of the reconsideration
request, the Tax Commission now argues that, under section 6346b-13(3)(b), its order is deemed to have been issued on December
30, 1991, and the Galleria's petition for review is untimely
because it was not filed within thirty days of that date, as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989). That
provision states:
A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30 days
after the date that the order constituting
the final agency action is issued fi£ is
considered to have been issued under
Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b).
Id. (emphasis added). The Tax Commission simply ignores the
disjunctive term "or" found in section 63-46b-14(3)(a) and
interprets the statute to mean that if an order is not issued
within the twenty day "deemed denied" period, the thirty-day
jurisdictional clock for judicial review begins irretrievably to
run.7
We disagree. A plain reading of the statute indicates that
a party may file a petition for judicial review within thirty
days after the order constituting the final agency action, in
this case the order denying reconsideration issued on March 10,
1992, "0£" within thirty days after the "deemed denied" date
established by section 63-46b-13(3)(b). In the instant case, the
Galleria filed its petition for review within thirty days of the
Tax Commission's March 10 final order and this court therefore
has jurisdiction to hear the case.8

6.

(...continued)
within 20 days after the filing of the
request, the request for reconsideration
shall be considered to be denied.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989).
7. In the Tax Commission's view, the parties' briefs filed with
and accepted by the commission in January of 1992 were for
naught, although accepted by the commission when tendered,
because they were filed more than twenty days after December 10,
and the commission's multiple page order of denial, issued weeks
later, was a completely meaningless gesture.
8. We note that Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 834 P.2d 568,
571-72 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992),
(continued...)
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our analysis of tax cases is guided by the standards of
review announced in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1993). OSI
Indus,, Inc. v. State Tax Common. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 34-35
(Utah App. 1993) (because section 59-1-610 is procedural, it
applies retroactively). See Miller Welding Supply. Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1993) (applying
section 59-1-610 to a sales tax case involving an audit conducted
between 1987 and 1989). But see Thorup Bros. Constr., Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 1993).9 Section
59-1-610 directs this court to
grant the commission no deference concerning
its conclusions of law, applying a correction
of error standard, unless there is an
explicit grant of discretion contained in a
statute at issue before the appellate court.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
This statute supersedes the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
insofar as it pertains to judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings. Id. § 59-1-610(2). Prior to the recent enactment
of section 59-1-610, it was the mandate of this court to
determine whether the Legislature had, either explicitly QT
8. (...continued)
relied on by the Tax Commission, does not support its position.
The Lopez court was concerned with the legal significance of a
letter issued within the twenty day "deemed denied" period of
S 63-46b-l3(3)(b) and whether it qualified as an order so as to
start the thirty-day jurisdictional time then, rather than upon
the elapse of twenty days. The instant case presents a
completely different question because the agency's final order
was issued well beyond the twenty-day period.
9. In Thorup. decided after both OSI and Miller Welding, the
Supreme Court reviewed whether the Tax Commission's action was
contrary to one of the commission's rules under a reasonableness
and rationality standard, citing the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1989). It
is unclear from the decision, since Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-61D was
not mentioned, whether the new statute was simply not consic^red
by the Court or whether the Court decided it was inapplicable,
either by its terms or because the Court does not subscribe -co
the retroactivity conclusion of OSI and Miller Welding. In ~he
face of such ambiguity, it is prudent to follow the clear
holdings of the previous decisions of this court. See State v.
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993).
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implicitly, granted an agency discretion and, if so, to review
the agency action for reasonableness. Morton Int'l. Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Utah 1991). See, e.g. .
SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1173
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax
Comm'n. 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992). Section 59-1-610
requires this court to depart from its prior practice and, in the
case of the Tax Commission, to refrain from reviewing agency
action under a deferential standard unless there is an explicit
grant of discretion. Since the statute at issue, section 59-12103, does not contain language which would even arguably
constitute an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax
Commission,10 the commission's action in interpreting the scope
of the sales tax on "admissions" must be reviewed without
deference and for correctness.
UTAH'S ADMISSION TAX
Utah imposes a sales tax on the amount paid or charged by a
purchaser for
admission to any place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation, including seats
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other
similar accommodations[•]
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992) (emphasis added).
The Tax Commission has adopted rules interpreting the key
language of the admission tax. Utah Administrative Code R865-1933S(A) (1993)n specifically states in pertinent part:

10. The case law indicates that where the Tax Commission has
been held to have discretion in the interpretation and
application of the sales tax statute, that delegation is
implicit. Compare Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d
876, 884-85 (Utah 1992) (decided before the adoption of § 59-1610 and finding a grant of discretion without stating whether it
is explicit or implicit) with SEMECO Indus.. Inc.'v. State Tax
Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1175-76 (Utah 1993)(Durham, J.,
dissenting)(finding implicit delegation to interpret terms within
Utah's sales tax statute). See also Morton Int'l. Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991).
11. We cite to the most recent version of the Utah Administrative
Code as a convenience to the reader. The portions of the rules
quoted in this opinion were the same, in all material respects,
throughout the audit period.
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A. "Admission" means the right or
privilege to enter into a place. Admission
includes the amount paid for the right to use
a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium,
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse,
meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type
of entertainment. Admission also includes
the right to use a table at a night club,
hotel, or roof garden whether such charge is
designated as a cover charge, minimum charge,
or any such similar charge.
Aside from its elaboration on seats and tables, not applicable
here, this rule speaks in terms of the right to enter a place and
not in terms of a fee charged to use facilities or equipment
within a place. As such, the rule merely incorporates the plain
and settled meaning of "admission." See, e.g.. Webster/s Third
New International Dictionary 28 (1976) (defining admission as,
inter alia, "an act of admitting . . .; permission or right to
enter").
Neither the existence nor the content of the interpretive
rule defining "admission" is meaningfully challenged in the
instant proceeding. The single issue for us, then, is this:
Assuming the rule reflects the correct interpretation of the
statute, as seems inarguable, did the Tax Commission decide
correctly that sales tax on admissions should be assessed on the
fees charged by the Galleria for the use of batting cages, the
roller rink, and laser tag? While the Tax Commission "recognizes
that distinctions between [bowling and batting cages] are
difficult to draw,"12 we hold no meaningful distinction can be
drawn for purposes of the admissions tax, given the Tax
Commission's own interpretation of "admission."
Not only does the record indicate no fee is charged for the
right or privilege to enter the Galleria, but individuals such as
coaches may enter the batting cage without paying an admission
fee. The situation is apparently no different for laser tag or
roller skating. Consequently, the Tax Commission erred in
departing from its traditional application of the rule. The rule

12. The Tax Commission, as admitted in the order denying the
petition for reconsideration in this case, has consistently taken
the position that bowling is not subject to the sales tax on
admission fees. Nor have fees for golfing, tennis, racguetball,
miniature golf, or driving ranges been subject to the tax* The
Tax Commission's application of its rule vis-a-vis bowling and
these other activities appears to be correct because no admission
fee is customarily charged for the "right or privilege to enter,"
for instance, a bowling alley.
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states that admission means the "right to enter a place.1' There
is simply no fee charged by the Galleria for admission to any
place; there are only fees charged to do particular things.13
Thus, given the Tax Commission's own interpretation of the
statute, as memorialized in its rule, its decision in this case
is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria is liable
for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating, batting
cages, and laser tag is therefore reversed.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Ls
Russell W. Bench, Judge

&g4*ft?f.
Norman H. Jackson, €Tudge

13. Language in another rule, which rule is vigorously
challenged by the Galleria, defines "place of amusement.11 That
rule has verbiage consistent with the Tax Commission's position.
See Utah Admin. Code R865-19-34S (1993) ("sale of"a ticket for a
ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to
a place of amusement"). However, given the scheme of § 59-12103(l)(f), the meaning of the terms "place of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation" becomes relevant only if the
threshold determination of an "admission" had been shown. Thus,
because we hold the fees charged by the Galleria for use of the
batting cages, etc., are not for admission, we need not go on to
decide whether those venues qualify as "place[s] of amusement,
entertainment, or recreation."

930053-CA
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today and make that a part of the record
and I will consider the timeliness and
determine from that whether I can consider the merits

George A. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
v.

The administrative law judge did not mislead Armstrong such that her right to a
fair hearing was jeopardized.

CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD

[5] Armstrong also argues her due
process rights were compromised by the
short duration of the appeals period. We
disagree. The Utah Supreme Court previously rejected this argument in addressing
the short statutory appeals period for those
appealing judgments from small claims
courts. Before a 1988 amendment increased the appeals period to ten days, an
appellant had only five days in which to
appeal a small claims court judgment.
Nevertheless, the supreme court found this
time period did not deprive appellants of
their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d
233, 233 (Utah) (small claims court appellant having five days to appeal is not denied equal protection and is "given a reasonable time within which to take an appeal"), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 909, 97
S.Ct. 299, 50 L.Ed.2d 277 (1976); accord
Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d
309, 311 (Utah 1979); see also Kapetanov
v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049,
1052 (Utah 1983) (small claims courts' fiveday appeals period does not offend due
process and fact that other civil appellants
have a thirty-day appeals period "is of no
consequence").

No. 910501-CA.

and Industrial Commission of
Utah, Respondents.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 27, 1992.

State employee sought review of jurisdictional hearing conducted by Career Service Review Board wherein Board determined that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear his employment grievance. The Court
of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that: (1) proceeding was a formal adjudicative one that
it could properly review; (2) letter from
hearing officer was not "written order"
and employee's petition for judicial review,
filed within 30 days of date his request for
reconsideration of hearing officer's decision
was deemed denied, was timely; (3) hearing officer's refusal to consider employee's
written proffer of facts did not violate due
process; and (4) Board lacked jurisdiction,
insofar as employee was not subjected to
"de facto suspension" when he opted to
take unpaid leave of absence in order to
attend law school, and employing agency
did not violate personnel rule by deciding
not to allow him to job share.
Affirmed.

CONCLUSION
We conclude the Board did not err in
declining to address the merits of Armstrong's untimely appeal.
Armstrong
failed to demonstrate good cause for filing
her appeal late, the deadline for filing an
appeal is not ambiguous, and Armstrong's
constitutional rights were not jeopardized.
Therefore, we affirm.
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur.

1. Administrative
®=>796

Law

and

Procedure

Questions regarding whether administrative agency has afforded petitioner due
process in its hearings are questions of
law, and court therefore does not give deference to agency's actions.
U.S.C.A.
ConstAmends. 5, 14.
2. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1)
Jurisdictional determinations are questions of law to which Court of Appeals
gives no deference.

LOPEZ v. CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BD.

Utan

^y

Cite as 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992)

3. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=*701
Officers and Public Employees <S=>72.41
Administrative appeal by state employee seeking review of jurisdictional hearing
conducted by Career Service Review Board,
wherein Board determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear employee's grievance, was formal adjudicative proceeding
that Court of Appeals could properly review; hearing was conducted and there
was no showing that any of the statutory
requirements of formal hearing set forth in
Utah Administrative Procedure Act had not
been met U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-8, 63-46b16.
4. Administrative

Law

and

Procedure

<s=>723

6. Officers and Public Employees <^72.61
State employee had burden of showing
that his grievance fit into statutorily designated category in order to bring that grievance before Career Service Review Board.
U.C A.1953, 67-19a-202(l).
7, Officers and Public Employees <e=>72.22
For purposes of determining whether
Career Service Review Board had jurisdiction of its grievance, senior investigator
with Utah State Industrial Commission was
not given "de facto suspension" when Commission required him to take unpaid leave
of absence in order to attend law school;
employee made conscious decision to attend
law school after being formally notified
that he would be required to take a leave of
absence if he did so. U.C.A.1953, 67-19a202(1).

Officers and Public Employees @=*72.47
Hearing officer's letter sent nine days
after state employee requested that officer
reconsider her decision, stating that officer
had read employee's motion and that it had
not persuaded her to change her decision,
was not"written order" within meaning of
Utah Administrative Procedure Act, insofar as it was not sufficiently detailed; thus,
employee's request for reconsideration was
deemed denied as matter of law 20 days
after it was filed, and his petition for judicial review, filed within 30 days of deemed
denial, was timely. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b10(1), 63-46b-13(3)(a, b), 63-46b-14(3)(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=>469
Constitutional Law <S=>278.4(5)
Officers and Public Employees <3=»72.16
Even if hearing officer improperly refused to consider state employee's written
proffer of facts, that refusal did not violate
due process, absent showing that hearing
officer's actions were patently unfair; employee was allowed to testify at length in
lieu of written statement, which did not
contain a single fact that employee was not
allowed to present orally. U.S.C.A. Const.
Amends. 5, 14.

8, Officers and Public Employees e=*72.22
For purposes of determining whether
Career Service Review Board had jurisdiction to hear state employee's grievance,
Utah State Industrial Commission's decision not to allow senior investigator to job
share did not violate personnel rule, insofar
as rule gave Commission full discretion as
to whether job sharing would be allowed.
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l).
Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
Before BENCH, P.J., and ORME and
RUSSON, JJ.
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Petitioner Lopez seeks review of a jurisdictional hearing conducted by respondent
Career Service Review Board (the Board),
wherein the Board determined that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear Lopez's employment grievance. We affirm.
FACTS
Lopez is a senior investigator with the
Utah State Industrial Commission (the
Commission). He claims that in 1989 he

„

_ —

_ ^

„

emu, u n u c i yiuwcot, o i g u c u a n d g i e e u i e m to

wards using investigators with legal training.1 Since Lopez had no legal training, he
decided that it would be to his professional
advantage to attend law school. He applied for and was accepted to the University of Utah law school. Upon learning of
his acceptance, Lopez requested that he be
allowed to work part-time while attending
law school. His immediate supervisor informed him in writing that his proposal to
work part-time was rejected. Lopez nevertheless pursued additional discussions in an
attempt to accommodate the interests of
the Commission. Various alternatives
were discussed, but none was accepted.
Lopez claims that at one point in the
discussions his supervisor asked him to
draft a contract reflecting his proposal to
work part-time on a job share basis. Lopez
assumed that the request indicated that his
job share proposal had been accepted. The
contract he prepared, however, was never
expressly accepted or rejected by the Commission.
Lopez went to law school. Part of his
proposed plan was that he would use his
annual leave while adjusting to law-school
life. He therefore took approximately one
month of annual leave at the beginning of
the school year. When he attempted to
return to work part-time, however, he was
informed that his proposal to job share was
still unacceptable. The Commission offered him the opportunity to work at a
temporary level for 19 hours a week, but,
because it was a temporary position, he
would be required to relinquish his career
service status. In the alternative, the Commission was willing to grant him a leave of
absence without pay, thereby keeping his
status intact. The only other alternative
was for him sitnply to resign his position.
Lopez opted to take the leave of absence

that effect. Following his first year of law
school, Lopez returned to full-time work
with the Commission in his former position.
Lopez filed a grievance that progressed
unsuccessfully through the Commission's
internal review process. Lopez then requested an evidentiary hearing before the
Board. Inasmuch as there was some question whether the Board was authorized to
hear the grievance, the administrator of
the Board ordered that a jurisdictional
hearing be conducted. The administrator
then recused himself due to a conflict
caused by his involvement with an advisory
board of the Commission, and a hearing
officer was appointed to conduct the hearing.
At the hearing, Lopez "proffered" his
version of the facts in writing. The hearing officer refused to accept his written
version due to its length and argumentative nature. The Commission proposed its
own "chronology" of events and documents, which was admitted without objection from Lopez. Lopez was then allowed
to testify as to any facts he felt were
relevant. His counsel questioned him for
approximately three hours. The hearing
officer then ruled that the grievance did
not come within any of the statutory categories over which the Board had jurisdiction. The hearing officer further held that
Lopez was not harmed by the Commission's
actions because he was allowed to return to
his former position after the leave of absence.
In accordance with section 13 of the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA),
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1989),
Lopez requested that the hearing officer
reconsider her decision.2 The decision was
not altered, and Lopez filed this petition for

1. The Commission denies any trend, but it does
admit that in advertisements for investigators it
had indicated that preference would be given to
those with legal training.

actions constitute "internal personnel actions
within an agency." The Board is an agency
external to the Commission to which personnel
matters are appealed. UAPA therefore applies.
This conclusion is supported by statutory language within the chapter establishing the Board
that indicates UAPA applies to actions by the
Board. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a202(2), 67-19a-203(6) (1986).

2. The Commission asserts that UAPA does not
govern this case because UAPA does not apply
to "internal personnel actions within an agency
concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those actions." Section 63-46b-l(2)(e).
The Board errs in asserting that the Board's

Cite as 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992)

review. He alleges three principal errors
bv the hearing officer: (1) the refusal to
accept his written proffer of facts was a
denial of due process, (2) the conclusion
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to
hear his grievance was erroneous, and (3)
the finding that he was not harmed by the
Commission's actions was clearly erroneous
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Questions regarding whether an
administrative agency has afforded a petitioner due process in its hearings are questions of law. We therefore do not give
deference to the agency's actions. Tolman
v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d
23, 28 (Utah App. 1991). Jurisdictional determinations are questions of law to which
we give no deference. Department of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132
(Utah 1989).
OUR JURISDICTION
Before addressing the merits of the petition, we consider two threshold questions
as to whether this court has jurisdiction.
Formal or Informal Proceedings
[3] The first jurisdictional question involves whether this administrative appeal
should be before the district court. UAPA
provides that district courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over administrative appeals
from informal adjudicative proceedings.
Section 63-46b-15. Administrative appeals
from formal adjudicative proceedings are
to be made either to this court or to the
supreme court. Section 63-46b-l6.
Administrative appeals that are improperly brought to this court are to be transferred to the district court pursuant to
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah
App.1990). In Alumbaugh, the administrator of the Career Services Review Board
conducted an administrative review of an
employee's grievance file without a hearing. We held that the absence of a hearing
ttade the Board's action informal, despite
the Board's designation of all adjudicative

proceedings as formal, and transferred the
case to district court for a trial de novo.
Id.
In the present case, the hearing officer
conducted a hearing. Lopez was allowed
to appear before the hearing officer and to
present his position. Evidence and documents were accepted into the record, and
a court reporter was present. There has
been no showing that any of the requirements of a formal hearing, as set forth in
section 8 of UAPA, have not been met.
Since there was a hearing! and there is no
showing of any violations of section 8, we
conclude that this was a formal adjudicative proceeding that we may properly review.
Timeliness
[4] The second jurisdictional question
involves the timeliness of Lopez's petition
to this court. The hearing officer entered
her decision on July 2, 1991. Lopez requested on July 22nd that the hearing officer reconsider her decision. On July 31st,
the hearing officer sent Lopez a letter.
The full text of the letter was as follows:
"I have read your Motion for Reconsideration and Evidentiary Hearing. This letter is to notify you that your motion has
not persuaded me to change my decision."
Lopez filed this petition for review on September 3rd.
Subsection 14(3)(a) of UAPA provides:
"A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30
days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is
considered to be issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b)." Subsection 13(3) applies
to requests that an agency reconsider its
action and provides:
(a) The agency head, or a person designated for that purpose, shall issue a written order granting the request or denying the request.
(b) If the agency head or the person
designated for that purpose does not issue an order within 20 days after the
filing of the request, the request for
reconsideration shall be considered to be
denied.

hearing officer constitutes a "written order." If it does, then Lopez's appeal is
untimely, the thirty days having run their
course on August 30th, four days before
Lopez filed his petition. If the letter did
not constitute a written order, then Lopez's
request for reconsideration was deemed denied, as a matter of law, on August 11th,
twenty days from his request. Lopez's
filing on September 3rd would therefore be
timely.
Section 10 of UAPA requires considerable detail in agency orders issued in connection with formal adjudicative proceedings.
It states, in pertinent part:
(1) Within a reasonable time after the
hearing, or after the filing of any posthearing papers permitted by the presiding officer, or within the time required
by any applicable statute or rule of the
agency, the presiding officer shall sign
and issue an order that includes:
(a) a statement of the presiding officer's findings of fact . . . ;
(b) a statement of the presiding officer's conclusions of law;
(c) a statement of the reasons for
the presiding officer's decision;
(d) a statement of any relief ordered
by the agency;
(e) a notice of the right to apply for
reconsideration;
(f) a notice of any right to adminis' trative or judicial review of the order
available to aggrieved parties; and
(g) the time limits applicable to any
reconsideration or review.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1989).
An ambiguous letter, merely indicating
that the request, for reconsideration was
unpersuasive, does not constitute a ''written order" as described in subsection 10(1).
As a matter of appellate necessity, we
must have unambiguous final administrative orders from which we may calculate
jurisdictional time periods. Otherwise, our
jurisdiction can become uncertain.
Inasmuch as the hearing officer's letter
was insufficient to constitute a written order as anticipated by subsection 13(3)(a),
Lopez's request for reconsideration is

section 13(3)(b). His petition for review is
therefore timely.
THE MERITS
Proffer of Facts
[5] Lopez first asserts that the hearing
officer denied him due process by not considering his written proffer of facts. He
relies upon Tolman for the proposition that
"due process demands a new trial when the
appearance of unfairness is so plain that
[the appellate court is] left with the abiding
impression that a reasonable person would
find the hearing unfair." Tolman, 818
P.2d at 28 (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Utah
1987)). Even if it were improper for the
hearing officer to refuse to consider Lopez's written version of the facts, as asserted by Lopez, he has nevertheless failed to
present to this court any explanation of
how the actions of the hearing officer were
patently unfair. At the hearing, Lopez
was allowed to testify at length in lieu of
the written statement. He has not directed
us to a single fact contained in the written
statement that he was not allowed to
present orally to the hearing officer. Given Lopez's opportunity to testify, we simply are not left with an abiding impression
that a reasonable person would find the
hearing unfair.
Jurisdiction of Board
The Board was established to provide
state civil service employees with a forum
for appealing personnel decisions outside
the agency for which they work. The
Board, however, does not have jurisdiction
to hear all appeals of all personnel matters.
Its jurisdiction is statutorily limited to certain agency actions.
(a) The board shall serve as the final
administrative body to review appeals
from career service employees arid agencies of decisions about promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written
reprimands, wages, salary, violations of
personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reduc-
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tions in force, and disputes concerning
abandonment of position that have not
been resolved at an earlier stage in the
grievance procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to
review or decide any other personnel
matters.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l) (Supp.
1991) (emphasis added).3
When an employee files a grievance with
the Board, subsection 403(2)(a) requires the
Board's administrator to determine the following factors before the Board may hear
the grievance.
(i) whether or not the employee is a
career service employee and is entitled to
use the grievance system,
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance,
(iii) whether or not the employee has
been directly harmed; and
(iv) the issues to be heard.
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a) (Supp.
1991).
In order to make the determinations required, the administrator may "hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may
present oral arguments, written arguments, or both." Subsection 67-19a403(2)(b)(i). This was the basis and goal of
the jurisdictional hearing from which Lopez
now appeals.4
[6] Lopez initially challenges the hearing officer's determination that the Board
lacked jurisdiction by asserting that the
Board's administrator erroneously placed
the "burden of proof" on Lopez to prove
that the Board had jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that a party wishing to bring a matter before a tribunal with limited subject
matter jurisdiction must present sufficient
facts to invoke the limited jurisdiction of
that tribunal. Department of Social
3. Ail other matters may be grieved only to the
level of the department head whose decision is
final and unappealable to the Board. See Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(2) (Supp. 1991).
4. Lopez asserts that the hearing officer improperly treated the jurisdictional hearing as a hearing on the merits. There is some language in
the hearing officer's decision that supports his
claim. As indicated in subsection 403(2)(b), the
jurisdictional hearing is to consider the four
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Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah
1989). It was therefore necessary for Lopez to show that his grievance fit into one
of the categories of grievances designated
in subsection 202(1) in order to bring his
grievance before the Board.
[7] Lopez argues the Board has jurisdiction because the Commission's requirement that he take a leave of absence without pay was a "de facto suspension." The
hearing officer, however, found that Lopez
made a conscious decision to attend law
school and that hits decision was made after
he had been formally notified that he would
be required to take a leave of absence if he
were to attend law school. The hearing
officer also found that the ongoing discussions between Lopez and the Commission
concerning other possible work alternatives
had not resulted in a meeting of the minds.
Given the hearing officer's factual findings, it is clear that the unpaid leave of
absence was the direct result of Lopez's
unilateral and voluntary decision to attend
law school. It was not in any way initiated
by the Commission. The record is clear
that Lopez was always free to remain in
his job full time as long as he did not elect
to attend law school He may not now
transform the direct result of his own voluntary decision into a "de facto suspension" by the Commission.
[8] Lopez also argues that the Commission violated several personnel rules when
it refused to allow him to work during law
school. As stated in subsection 202(1),
grievances arising from violations of personnel rules are within the Board's jurisdiction. Lopez points to Human Resource
Management Rule R468-5-12, which states
with our emphasis:
factors set out in subsection 403(2)(a). If an
employee's grievance meets the statutory requirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the employee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the
claim. Any language suggesting that the hearing officer considered the actual merits of Lopez's grievance was nevertheless harmless since
the factual findings clearly show that jurisdiction was lacking as a matter of law.
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Agency management may establish a
program of job sharing as a means of
increasing opportunities for career parttime employment In the absence of an
agency program, individual employees
may request approval for job sharing
status through agency management.
Utah Admin.Code § R468-&-12 (1991).
The hearing officer held that the Commission's decision not to allow Lopez to job
share was not a violation of this policy
because the rule gives the Commission full
discretion whether to allow job sharing.
The hearing officer reasoned that since
there was no mandate that job sharing be
allowed, job sharing was a privilege that
might be granted by the Commission, but it
was not a right to which Lopez was entitled
by law. Since the Commission's decision
not to allow job sharing was within its
discretion, Lopez's complaint could not logically constitute a claim that a personnel
rule had been "violated." We agree.

gory of grievances over which the Board
had jurisdiction. Regardless of whether or
not Lopez was harmed, the Board could not
hear the grievance. We therefore need not
address this final claim of error.

Discretionary personnel powers granted
to agencies do not constitute mandates.
Absent a statutory mandate that an employee receive a certain benefit, the employee may not demand it as a right. Since
there was no mandate requiring the Commission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez
has failed to identify any personnel rule
that was violated by the Commission's refusal to allow him to job share. Jurisdiction therefore was properly denied.5

v.

Harm to Lopez
Finally, Lopez claims that the hearing
officer erred when she found that he had
not been harmed by being "required" to
take an unpaid leave of absence because he
was able to return to his former position.
Whether Lopez was directly harmed by the
Commission's action is the third factor to
be determined at a jurisdictional hearing.
See section 67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii). However,
the hearing officer did not need to reach
this issue because she determined that Lopez's grievance did not fall within the cate5. Lopez also points to the Human Resource
Management Rules regarding "Time Limited Po
sitions," Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-10 (1991),
and "Education Assistance," Utah Admin.Code
§ R468-10-^(1991). We limit our discussion to

CONCLUSION
The hearing officer's finding that the
Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Lopez's
grievance is affirmed.
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur

Jasbir S. BHATIA, Petitioner,

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY; and Pizza Hut of
Utah, Respondents.
No. 910498-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 2, 1992.

Cook sought judicial review of final
decision of Board of Review of Industrial
Commission denying his application for unemployment compensation benefits. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J.,
held that cook who stormed out of restaurant during middle of busy shift after uttering vulgarity to manager was discharged for "just cause" and not entitled to
unemployment compensation benefits.
Affirmed.
Bench, P.J., concurred and filed opinion.
the policy on job sharing since our analysis
applies equally to all three policies Under
these rules, agencies are given the ability to
create time limited positions and provide education assistance in their discretion.
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Q. Did you have some purpose in
mind why you didn't want a venogram to
your right leg? A. Definitely, general
pain and nothing wrong with the right
leg
Q Was there any other reason? A.
Medically I didn't—medically I didn't
think it was necessary.
Since Mercer testified there was nothing
wrong with her right leg which would require testing, the subject was opened for
refutation. Defendants were entitled to introduce evidence of usual medical practice
to show medical necessity of a right leg
venogram to diagnose possible, visually undetectable blood clots of the right leg.
Mercer additionally contends evidence of
hospital consent procedures is not relevant
to her consent to a right leg venogram.
Consent, however, is a factual issue in the
present case. Existing hospital consent
procedures, especially those followed in behalf of Mercer by her husband, seem relevant to a factual determination concerning
the consent in issue.

amination of plaintiff's witness Dr. Dall as
well as through introduction of hospital records which noted administration of the lung
scan tests.

[7] III. Failure to resist testing. In
her direct testimony early in the trial Mercer testified she physically resisted administration of the right leg venogram. In this
appeal, however, appellant Mercer contends
evidence of lack of physical resistance was
not relevant to consent and that defendants
thereby introduced an erroneous element of
necessity of resistance into, consent law.
Since plaintiff Mercer, herself, testified
to her physical resistance to the right leg
venogram, defendants were entitled to
present evidence in rebuttal under the authorities discussed in division I above. We
cannot say trial court erred in permitting
the defense to contradict plaintiffs direct
testimony.
We have considered all contentions raised
by plaintiff and find them to be without
merit
AFFIRMED.
[6] II. Similar test procedures. Shortly after her admission to the hospital Mercer underwent lung scan tests which, testimony showed, were similar in many re( O I K£Y«UMB£RSYSTE*£
spects to venograms. Appellant Mercer
contends in this appeal that such consent to
lung scan tests is not relevant to the issue
of consent to a bilateral venogram. We
need not review the exercise of trial court's
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
discretion on this issue, however, since the
Petitioner-Appellant,
challenged evidence is admissible on an alternative ground.
v.
We have said a party cannot complain on IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORappeal of evidence which the party, himself,
TATION REGULATIONS BOARD,
introduced into the record. See Brown v.
Respondent-Appellee,
First National Bank of Mason City, 193
Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc.,
N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 1972) (challenged
Intervenor-Appeilee.
evidence of gossip and rumor concerning
bank investigation elicited by appellant as
No, 62630.
defendant at trial) and Times-Guthrian
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Publishing Co. v. Guthrie County Vedette,
256 Iowa 302, 304, 125 N.W.2d 829, 831
Aug. 29, 1979.
(1964) (challenged subscription card brought
out by appellant as plaintiff at trial). The
record reveals that Mercer introduced eviAutomobile manufacturer petitioned
dence of the lung scans'" through direct ex- for judicial review of denial by the Trans-
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portation Regulations Board of application
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement
for a new automobile dealership. The Polk
District Court, A. B. Crouch, J., sustained
motion to dismiss, and appeal was taken.
The Supreme Court, Harris, J., held that:
(1) where application for rehearing of administrative decision was filed March 22,
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled
on by the agency, and thus 30-day period
for applying for judicial review ended May
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a
written denial of the application for rehearing on April 14, 1978, and (2) failure to
timely file application for judicial review
was a jurisdictional defect
Affirmed.

L Administrative Law and Procedure
«=»722
Where application for rehearing of administrative decision was filed March 22,
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled
on by the agency, and thus 30-day period
for applying for judicial review ended May
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a
written denial of the application for rehearing on April 14, 1978. I.C.A. §§ 17A.16,
subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3.
2. Automobiles <s=>84
Failure to timely file application for
judicial review of ruling of the Transportation Regulations Board denying application
to enter into an automobile franchise agreement was a jurisdictional defect. I.C.A.
§§ 17A.16, subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3.

Robert F. Holz, Jr. and Edwin N. Mcintosh, Des Moines, for appellant.
T. Scott Bannister and Martha Martell,
Des Moines, for respondent-appellee.
Joseph E. Day of Hines, Pence, Day &
Powers, Cedar Rapids, and W. Don Brittin,
Jr., of Nyemaster, Goode, McLaughlin, Emery & O'Brien, Des Moines, for intervenorappellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and
UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK,
and LARSON, JJ.
HARRIS, Justice.
This appeal turns on whether a petition
for judicial review of an administrative action was timely. The trial court held the
petition was not timely and that the tardiness was fatal to its jurisdiction. We agree.
Ford Motor Company filed an application
with the transportation regulation board of
the Iowa department of transportation,
pursuant to section 322A.6, The Code 1975,
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement
for a new Ford dealership in Cedar Rapids.
The application was resisted by various intervening Ford dealers located in the area,
including Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. Following a hearing the department denied
Ford's application.
Ford filed an application for rehearing,
pursuant to section 17A.16(2), The Code
1977 (Iowa Administrative Procedure Act).
The department denied Ford's motion for
rehearing. Ford thereafter petitioned for
judicial review of the department's decision,
pursuant to section 17A.19, The Code 1977.
Bob Zimmerman Ford moved to dismiss the
petition as untimely. This appeal is from a
trial court ruling sustaining Zimmerman's
motion to dismiss
[1] I. The question calls for interpretation of the following provisions from the
administrative procedure act:
Any party may file an application for
rehearing, stating the specific grounds
therefor and the relief sought, within
twenty days after the issuance of any
final decision by the agency in a contested case. A copy of such application ahaU
be timely mailed by the applicant to all
parties of record not joining therein.
Such an application for rehearing shall be
deemed to have been denied unless the
agency grants the application within
twenty days after its filing.
§ 17A.16(2) (emphasis added).
If a party files an application under
section 17A.1G, subsection 2, for rehearing
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with the agency, the petition for judicial
review must be filed within thirty days
after that application has been denied or
deemed denied.
§ 17A.19(3) (emphasis added).
Ford's difficulty stems from the fact that
its application for rehearing was "deemed
denied" under section 17A.16(2) before the
agency's written denial was filed. But
Ford ignored the "deemed denied" provision
of the statute and paced its subsequent
filing timetable from the date the written
denial was filed. The dates were as follows: Ford's application for rehearing (under section 17A.16(2)) was filed March 22,
1978. By operation of the statute this application was deemed denied April 11, 1978,
when it had not been ruled upon by the
agency. Nevertheless, the agency filed a
written denial of the application April 14,
1978. Under section 17A.19(3) Ford had 30
days in which to petition for judicial review.
The statute states that the 30-day period
begins to run when the application before
the agency "has been denied or deemed
denied."
Because the application before the agency was deemed denied April 11, the application for judicial review was due May 11,
1978. The trial court dismissed the proceeding because it was not filed until May
12, 1978.

Ford argues that some administrative
agencies might, for various reasons, meet
irregularly. Under the trial court's interpretation of section 17A.19(3)—which we
adopt—inability to meet within the statutory period would rob the agency of its jurisdiction to act on an application to review its
own decision. Ford assails this interpretation as at once harsh and absurd.
We conceded that the operation of the
statute might seem harsh, especially where,
as here, a party might have been misled by
the nullity of a later filing.' Nevertheless,
we believe that the statutory scheme is
neither absurd nor unfair. Parties to the
proceedings have a need for and a right to a
prompt disposition of a dispute. We are
confident that the legislature was fully
aware that administrative agencies might
meet irregularly. Hence, in the interests of
a prompt disposition of disputes, the legislature superimposed an automatic denial of
any application not ruled upon within the
prescribed period.
Regrettable hardships may well result to
litigants who are unaware of the "deemed
denied" provision of the statute. But it is
in the over-all interests of litigants and the
public at large that administrative proceedings move to a prompt conclusion. The
legislature obviously had the broader public
interest in mind in adopting the statute.

[2] II. In Kerr v. Iowa Public Service
The trial court was right in determining
Co., 274 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1979), we that Ford's petition for judicial review was
pointed out:
untimely.
Judicial review of the administrative proAFFIRMED.
ceedings is a right conferred by statute.
[Authorities.]
We have said that where a right of
judicial review is statutory, the procedure
prescribed, by the statute must be fol( O I KEYNUM8£RSYSTElC
lowed. [Authority.] . . . [F]ailure
to satisfy requirements of § 17A.19 [is] a
jurisdictional defect
. . . .
See Richards v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 270 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1978);
Iowa Public Service Company v. Iowa State
Commerce Commission, 263 N.W.2d 766, 770
(Iowa 1978).
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Flora L. DAVIS
v.
ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY, and Michael Horsley, as Commissioner.
Civ. 6114.
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
Dec. 9, 1987.
.ate medicaid agency determined applicant was disqualified from receiving
licaid benefits for period of three months and notified applicant of
,ermination on January 16. Applicant filed rehearing application on January
was advised of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial review
ild be had pursuant to statute by letter dated March 10, and forwarded notice
appeal by letter dated April 9. The Circuit Court, Montgomery County,
liam R. Gordon, J., found the applicant's notice of appeal was untimely and
missed appeal. Applicant appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Ingram, J.,
d that appeal was untimely, as application for rehearing was deemed denied
expiration of 30 days and applicant was required to file notice of appeal
hin 30 days after decision on application for rehearing,
firmed.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE k722.1
Jc722.1
merly 15Ak722
icaid benefit applicant's April 9th appeal from determination that applicant
disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for period of three months,
which applicant was notified on January 16, was untimely; although
licant filed application for rehearing on January 27 and was advised by
ter dated March 10 of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial
iew could be had under statute, her application for rehearing was deemed
ied by operation of law at expiration of 30 days, on February 26, and
licant was statutorily required to file notice of appeal within 30 days
er decision on application for rehearing, so notice of appeal should have
n filed within 30 days of date application for rehearing was deemed denied,
ruary 26. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e ) , 41-22-20(a, d ) .
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE k241.115
fck241.115
icaid benefit applicant's April 9th appeal from determination that applicant
disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for period of three months,
tfhich applicant was notified on January 16, was untimely; although
Licant filed application for rehearing on January 27 and was advised by
ter dated March 10 of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial
Lew could be had under statute, her application for rehearing was deemed
Led by operation of law at expiration of 30 days, on February 26, and
Licant was statutorily required to file notice of appeal within 30 days
*r decision on application for rehearing, so notice of appeal should have
l filed within 30 days of date application for rehearing was deemed denied,
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[2] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE k722.1
15Ak722.1
Formerly 15Ak722
Letter advising medicaid benefit applicant of denial of her application for
rehearing and notifying applicant that judicial review could be had under
statute was not sufficient to extend applicant's time for seeking judicial
review; no active misrepresentation of date of decision relevant to time for
review was made. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e ) , 41-22-20(a, d ) .
[2] SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE k241.115
356Ak241.115
Letter advising medicaid benefit applicant of denial of her application for
rehearing and notifying applicant that judicial review could be had under
statute was not sufficient to extend applicant's time for seeking judicial
review; no active misrepresentation of date of decision relevant to time for
review was made. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e ) , 41-22-20(a, d ) .
*538 Lawrence F. Gardella of Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Inc.,
Montgomery, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
appellees.
INGRAM, Judge,
his appeal arises under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, Ala.
Code 1975, s 41-22-1, et seq. (act), from an administrative hearing decision by
the Alabama *539 Medicaid Agency (agency) denying applicant's medicaid
benefits for three months. The circuit court found that the applicant's notice
of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal. The applicant now appeals to
this court.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether or not the circuit court erred in
dismissing the appeal.
The record in pertinent part reveals that on January 16, 1987, the applicant
was notified that she was disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for a
period of three months. The applicant then filed an application for rehearing
on January 27, 1987. By letter dated March 10, 1987, the applicant was advised
of the denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial review could be had
under the act. On April 15, 1987, the agency received applicant's notice of
appeal by letter dated April 9, 1987.
[1] The applicant contends that the period of time within which she had to
file her notice of appeal ran from March 10, 1987, the date the agency sent the
letter notifying applicant of their decision. The agency, however, contends
that the time to file the notice of appeal ran from the date the application
for rehearing was deemed denied by law, February 26, 1987.
The applicable provisions of the act are as follows:
"(a) Any party to a contested case who deems himself aggrieved by a final
order and who desires to have the same modified or set aside may, within 15
days after entry of said order, file an application for rehearing, which shall
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cify in detail the grounds for the relief sought therein and authorities in
port thereof.
•• • •

(e) .... If the agency enters no order whatsoever regarding the application
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hin the 30-day period, the application shall be deemed to have been denied
of the expiration of the 30-day period. (Acts 1981, No. 81-855, p. 1534, s
)"

ctions 41-22-17(a) and (e).
(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within
agency (other than rehearing) and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a
tested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter. A
liminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately
iewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate
edy.
....

(d) The notice of appeal or review shall be filed within 30 days after the
eipt of the notice of or other service of the final decision of the agency
n the petitioner or, if a rehearing is requested under section 41-22-17,
din 30 days after the decision thereon."
ctions 41-22-20(a) and (d).
is clear from the above provision that if the agency does not enter an
sr within thirty days of the filing of the application for rehearing, the
lication is deemed denied by operation of law at the expiration of the
rty-day period. Ala. Code 1975, s 41-22-17(e). Further, the statute is
ar that the applicant is required to file the notice of appeal within thirty
s after the decision on the application for rehearing. Ala. Code 41-22-

i).
re, the application for rehearing was filed on January 27, 1987, and by
ration of law was deemed denied on February 26, 1987. Therefore, pursuant
the act, the notice of appeal should have been filed within thirty days from
ruary 26, 1987. As this was not done, the trial court did not err in
tiissing the appeal.
iitionally, we agree with the trial court's apt and concise analogy,
^h follows:
Appeals from agency decisions are purely statutory, and the time
strictions must be satisfied. Although this result may seem harsh at first
5h, our Rules of Civil Procedure have a similar mechanism embodied in Rule
L, A.R.Civ.P. A motion for new trial, et cetera, is deemed denied if not
3d on within 90 days. The fact that a court may enter an order after the 90
period ruling on the motion has no effect in determining the date that the
Lee of appeal *540 must be filed. The order is a mere nullity. Olson
Olson, 367 So.2d 504 (Ala.Civ.App.1979)."
] We further note that this case is factually distinguishable from Ex
te Four Seasons, Ltd., 450 So.2d 110 (Ala.1984). In Ex parte Four
sons, the supreme court held that the secretary actively misrepresented in
notice to the taxpayer that the final decision was "this date." No such
24

active misrepresentation occurred in the instant case. The letter dated March
10, 1987, to the applicant simply stated that the rehearing was denied and
vised the applicant that judicial review was pursuant to the act.
in view of the above, it is clear that the circuit court did not err in
dismissing the applicant's petition for review in that she failed to timely
file her notice of appeal pursuant to the act.
This case is due to be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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BRADLEY, P.J., and HOLMES, J., concur.
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